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Abstract. Immigration has been fervently debated in recent history. This research investigates
what effect certain economic and non-economic variables have on individuals’ likelihood to be
pro-immigration. This is extended to individuals in the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey,
analyzed with separate regressions. My research uses data from the 2013 International Social
Survey Programme and logit regression methods to explore the relationship, mimicking research
done by Anne Maria Mayda, as reported in the 2006 paper “Who Is Against Immigration? A
Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants”. This research updates
Mayda’s by using the most recent data available and compares only the three previously
specified countries. Key results of my research show that sex and age are not significant in the
United States or Great Britain, while being male and being younger influences individuals in
Turkey to be more pro-immigration. Additionally, more education led to more pro-immigration
sentiments in the U.S. and the U.K., though not in Turkey. Moreover, I find that individuals in
different countries are impacted by different variables, with no single variable being significant
for all models in all three countries. The results of this research have application for those hoping
to understand or to sway public opinion on immigration.
Keywords: Immigration preferences
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1. Introduction
Immigration to the United States has continued to be a hotly debated topic in recent
history. Both those in support of and in opposition to immigration to the United States have
spoken up particularly during this election season, passionately disagreeing with those on the
other side. However, this is an issue that many countries face, as we have seen with immigration
also being a major issue in the discussions of the Brexit proposition and in the international
debates on how and where Syrian refugees will be accepted.
In exploring which characteristics result in more pro-immigration sentiments, I explore
the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey. The United States was chosen because of the
political divide on immigration apparent during the 2016 Presidential Election. Great Britain was
chosen because of the significance of immigration opinions during the Brexit proposition.
Finally, Turkey was chosen because during the time of this writing, Turkey has accepted the
most refugees from Syria in a time where many countries are trying to limit their entry. Within
the scope of these three countries, my research assesses whether previously significant economic
and non-economic variables are still significant in the present-day, and also provides the specific
ability to look into what may be the identical or varying causes of acceptance of/resistance to
immigration in the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey.
Using 2013 International Social Survey Programme National Identity (ISSP-NI) data, I
research what factors explain who is for immigration, analyzing only those surveyed in the
United States, Great Britain or the United Kingdom, and Turkey, for the purpose of comparison.
My results reveal that there was no single variable that was consistently significant for all three
countries, suggesting that different factors influence different countries, rather than certain
variables consistently impacting immigration opinions.
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2. Literature Review
Previous research on the topic of attitudes toward immigration has examined the effects
of both economic and non-economic factors. Mayda (2006) uses data from the 1995 International
Social Survey Programme National Identity (ISSP-NI), consisting of over 20,000 respondents
from 22 countries, as well as data from the 1995-1997 World Value Survey (WVS) dataset that
includes information from more than 50,000 respondents from 44 developing countries. In
comparing respondents’ declared opinions on immigration with the economic and noneconomic
characteristics the respondents held, Mayda found that having older age, being female, living in a
rural area, not having parents with foreign citizenship, having less education, political affiliation
with the right, having a lower social class, being a trade union member, being monocultural, and
agreeing with certain patriotic/nationalistic statements have significant effect on not holding a
pro-immigration attitude. Mayda also concludes that though education overall had a significant
positive effect on immigration attitudes, education had a negative coefficient in economies with a
GDP per capita of less than approximately $4480.
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) come to similar overall findings after analyzing 24
countries’ with the 1995 ISSP-NI data, revealing that anti-immigrant attitudes are prompted by
low skill level, older age, being female, lack of employment, lack of national and/or international
mobility, patriotism, chauvinism, protectionism, being a native citizen, having native citizens as
parents, and never having lived abroad. The results of both Mayda and of O’Rourke and Sinnot
describe age, sex, and education as significant.
Hainsmueller and Hiscox (2007) look more closely at education by analyzing European
voters with the 2003 European Social Survey data. They find that those with higher education
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levels are more likely to support the immigration of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers,
suggesting that people are not against immigration because of market competition. They further
find that a college-style education made an impact that other forms of skills training did not,
suggesting openness to immigration and trade may be tied to a change in values and beliefs as
education increases in college (e.g. less racism, more belief that immigration and trade openness
is good for the economy). This idea is supported by Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston’s
research (2007) that looked at the significance of labor market concerns versus welfare concerns
versus racial or cultural concerns in Great Britain with data from several years of the British
Social Attitudes Survey. They find that welfare was of greater concern than labor market
conditions, and racial/cultural concerns made an impact only when the immigrants were from
ethnically different backgrounds. This means that, in support of the range of variables Mayda
(2006) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find to be significant, attitudes on immigration are
caused by more than just economic characteristics.
My research will build on the above previous research on immigration attitudes, updating
Mayda’s research (2006) by using more recent data and comparing the results of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey specifically.

3. Data and Model
I use data from the 2013 ISSP National Identity survey, which consists of over 45,000
respondents from 34 countries. Individuals responded to demographic and opinion statements on
the questionnaire, identifying their age, education, number of children, income, religious views,
affiliation with the political right, agreement with nationalistic sentiments, and etcetera. Question
10 of the questionnaire reads “Do you think the number of immigrants to [respondent’s country]
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nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as it is, (d)
increased a little, or (e) increased a lot”. This question was adapted to become my dependent proimmigration dichotomous variable FORIMM. Respondents who answered that they believe
immigration should be increased a little or increased a lot are considered pro-immigration and
obtain a value of one for FORIMM. Those who indicated that immigration levels should remain
the same, decrease a little, or decrease a lot were not considered pro-immigration and obtain a
value of zero for FORIMM. Individuals who indicated that they could not choose and those who
did not respond to this question were eliminated from the dataset, as their attitudes toward
immigration could not be determined.

Model
I apply logit regression techniques to determine how the previously discussed factors
determine the probability an individual will have pro-immigration sentiments. Because the
dependent variable is dichotomous, ordinary least squares estimates are not ideal due to OLS
producing unrestricted results that may predict a value less than zero or greater than one for the
probability that an individual will be pro-immigration. OLS is additionally not ideal because of
the heteroscedasticity in its disturbances and the lack of consistency in its standard errors. A logit
model is preferred to estimate the probability of an individual being pro-immigration, which
places bounds at one and zero.
I run four regressions. I start with a base equation that incorporates the most standard of
characteristics: sex, age, and years of education. In Equation 2, I add work variables, household
variables, religion, and citizenship for the next level of characteristics explored. I then add the
native citizenship of one’s parents and the dummy variables for urban living BIGCITY to further
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broaden the variables controlled for in Equation 3. Finally, Equation 4 adds the single variable
RIGHT to identify the effects that this characteristic has, added last in order to be able to see
other variables’ influences clearly due to RIGHT’S strong influence on immigration opinions in
the United States. In Great Britain, the citizenship of individuals’ mothers and fathers were not
available, and these variables are thus not controlled for in Great Britain. Similarly, in Turkey,
around 30 percent of respondents did not indicated the number of school-age or under school-age
children they had, so these variables were not controlled for in Turkey. Below are the logit
regression models I will compare, displaying the variables used for the United States in the cases
of diversity in variable names:
Equation 1
P (FORIMM) = b0 + b1 MALE + b2 AGE + b3 EDUCYRS + e
Equation 2
P (FORIMM) = b0 + b1 MALE + b2 AGE + b3 EDUCYRS + b4 CWORK + b5
MARRIED+ b6 HHCHILDR + b7 HHTODD + b8 US_INC + b9 RELGION1 + b10
RELIGION3 + b11CITIZEN + e
Equation 3
P (FORIMM) = b0 + b1 MALE + b2 AGE + b3 EDUCYRS + b4 CWORK + b5
MARRIED+ b6 HHCHILDR + b7 HHTODD + b8 US_INC + b9 RELGION1 + b10
RELIGION3 + b11CITIZEN + b12 F_BORN + b13 M_BORN + b14 BIGCITY + e
Equation 4
P (FORIMM) = b0 + b1 MALE + b2 AGE + b3 EDUCYRS + b4 CWORK + b5
MARRIED+ b6 HHCHILDR + b7 HHTODD + b8 US_INC + b9 RELGION1 + b10
RELIGION3 + b11CITIZEN + b12 F_BORN + b13 M_BORN + b14 BIGCITY + b15
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RIGHT + e

4. Results
Variables are defined and their mean and standard deviations are reported in Table I. The
dependent variable FORIMM is used to describe an individual’s opinion on immigration being
that immigration should either (1) be increased a lot or (2) be increased a little, as opposed to an
opinion that immigration levels should remain the same, be reduced a little, or be reduced a lot.
Under this definition, 14.5 percent of respondents in the United States are pro-immigration, 3.7
percent of respondents in Great Britain are pro-immigration, and 6.3 percent of respondents in
Turkey are pro-immigration.

Logit Regression Results
The estimated coefficients, their standard errors, and their marginal effects are reported in
Table II for the United States, in Table III for the United Kingdom, and in Table IV for Turkey.
The marginal effect of the probability of a particular independent variable is calculated as
δP(y=1)/δx=bP(1-P), where x is the independent variable, b is the logit estimate, P is the
probability that y equals 1, and (1-P) represents the probability that y is 0.

United States Results
It was expected that the models would confirm that being male, being younger, and
having more education correlates with being more pro-immigration, in accordance with common
existing research findings. In the United States, neither sex nor age were significant for any of
the four equations. Education, however, was significantly and positively correlated for all four
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equations with years of education having coefficients approximating around .01 for each model,
meaning for each year of schooling an individual has, he or she is around one percent more likely
to be pro-immigration.
Marital status, number of children of school-age, number of children under school-age,
income, the native citizenship of one’s mother, nor living in an urban area were found to be
significant in any model for the United States for the year 2013. The lack of significance of
income confirms Mayda’s finding that income is not significant; this is likely because education
level has more of an impact on immigration attitudes than one’s skill level and resulting income
does, which is in coincidence with Hainsmueller and Hiscox’s findings.
In addition to education, results for the U.S. show significance in having a native citizen
as a father and in being affiliated with the political right. While affiliation with the right was
been found to be significant by Mayda, the significance of having a native citizen for a father is a
surprising finding. This is especially surprising considering native citizenship of one’s mother
does not have the same effect in sign, intensity, or significance.
The remainder of the variables were not found to be consistently significant or
insignificant for the United States. However, it is noteworthy that being in a religious minority
tended to correlate positively with significance with pro-immigration attitudes. Another striking
finding is that being currently employed and being a native citizen tended to correlate negatively
with pro-immigration attitudes.

Great Britain Results
The results for Great Britain do not show consistent significance in sex or age in terms of
influencing attitude toward immigration. However, I find a strongly correlated significance for
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education in all four models with a positive coefficient, suggesting that the more education one
has the more likely he or she is to be pro-immigration, though this was with a smaller coefficient
than was the case for the United States. Additionally, those living in or around big cities and
those who identified with a non-Christian religion were shown to have more pro-immigration
attitudes in Great Britain, as can be seen by the significant and positive coefficient of the
variables BIGCITY and RELIGION1.
Many variables other than sex and age were found to not be significant in Great Britain,
including work status, marital status, number of school-age children, number of children younger
than school-age, income, being non-religious, being a citizen of Great Britain, and being
affiliated with the political right. Demographic variables like marital status and number of
children being insignificant is unsurprising due to previous researchers tending to not present
family variables in their investigation. Work status and income being consistently insignificant is
also unsurprising due to Hainsmueller and Hiscox’s research and Dustmann and Preston’s
research showing that education variables are more important in influencing immigration opinion
than job market variables. However, it is noteworthy that being affiliated with the political right
did not have notable significance in Great Britain as it did in the United States.

Turkey Results
In Turkey, unlike in the United States and Great Britain, sex showed positive significance
in three of the four models and age had negative significance is all models, while education was
consistently insignificant and negative. This trend for education may be a case of skill level
becoming a negatively correlated variable with lower GDP per capita, as Mayda (2006) describes
in her findings. However, while Mayda finds this to occur below a GDP of around $4480,
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Turkey’s GDP per capita in 2013 was over $10,000 according to the World Bank, meaning this
result was surprising (“GDP per capita…”).
Turkey additionally found work status and income to influence attitudes, which was
largely not the case in the United States or Great Britain, with being employed having a negative
and significant impact and higher income having a positive and significant impact. This means
that being employed made someone less likely to be pro-immigration, but higher income made
him/her more likely to be pro-immigration. This tells us that those who are employed but do not
have a high income are unlikely to be for immigration. Considering education also shows a
negative sign, it is possible that while it has been found in some countries that education has
more of an impact than job market conditions, anti-immigration attitudes in Turkey may be
based more on the job market than on racial and cultural concerns.
CITIZEN and BIGCITY are also significant, both with negative coefficients. This means
that those surveyed were less likely to be pro-immigration if they were citizens of Turkey and
less likely to be pro-immigration if they lived in or around a big city. Because Mayda (2006)
found that living in a rural area caused individuals to be less likely to be pro-immigration, and
the results for Great Britain reaffirmed this conclusion, the opposite result for Turkey is an
interesting finding.
The results for Turkey show the following variables in addition to years of education to
not be significant: marital status, being in the dominant religious group of Sunni, native
citizenship of one’s mother, and being affiliated with the political right. Not being surprised by
the family variables, it is notable that political party and being in the dominant religious group is
not significant in Turkey.
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5. Summary and Conclusions
In the United States and Great Britain, years of education had a positive and significant
correlation with having pro-immigration sentiments, as is to be expected with prior research
suggesting that more education correlates with more open perspectives on immigration.
However, it was an oddity that this was not the case for any of the four equations in Turkey,
where the GDP per capita was over $10,000 in 2013, significantly higher than the $4480 where
Mayda found education to no longer turn a positive coefficient. My research additionally found
that despite sex and age tending to be significant in existing research, neither results for the
United States nor results for Great Britain showed significance for these variables. Finally, my
results show that the same variables do not produce the same results in these different countries,
with not a single variable being consistently significant for all three tested countries.
Further research may investigate the impact of union membership, patriotism,
nationalism, protectionism, chauvinism, and mobility as previous research has, in order to test
whether the researchers’ findings are still accurate today and whether particular characteristics
are more impactful in some countries than in others. Determining these variations and the
reasons behind them would broaden our understanding of immigration attitudes around the
world.
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Table I. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Definition
Mean (Standard Deviation)
USA
Great Britain
Turkey
FORIMM
1 if pro-immigration; 0 if otherwise .1446 (.0111)
.0367 (.0071)
.0633 (.0102)
MALE
1 if male; 0 if otherwise
.4769 (.0158)
.4407 (.01867)
.5167 (.0210)
AGE
Age in years
48.56 (.5349)
52.33 (.6495)
41.56 (.6300)
EDUCYRS
Years of schooling
13.84 (.0959)
12.73 (.1135)
7.41 (.1844)
CWORK
1 if currently working; 0 if
.6155 (.0154)
.5395 (.0187)
.3989 (.0205)
otherwise
MARRIED
1 if married; 0 if otherwise
.4478 (.0157)
.4873 (.0188)
.6872 (.0195)
HHCHILDR Number of school-age children (5
.7490 (.1994)
.8941 (.2796)
years of age or older) in the
household
HHTODD
Number of children younger than
.3323 (.1409)
.7076 (.2792)
school-age (younger than 5 years
of age) in the household
US_INC
Approximate income in USD
62,294.68 (1,504.34)
GB_INC
Approximate income in GBP
2,679.46 (74.52)
TR_INC
Approximate income in TRY
1462.06 (55.51)
RELIGION1 1 if identifying with a non.0452 (.0066)
.0452 (.0078)
Christian religion; 0 if otherwise
RELIGION2 1 if identifying with a Christian
.7470 (.0138)
.4703 (.0188)
religion; 0 if otherwise
RELIGION3 1 if identifying as not having a
.2078 (.0129)
.4845 (.0188)
religion; 0 if otherwise
SUNNI
1 if identifying with the Sunni
.9174 (.0116)
religion; 0 if otherwise
CITIZEN
1 if a citizen of the country; 0 if
.9438 (.0073)
.9675 (.0067)
.9930 (.0035)
otherwise
FBORN
1 if respondent’s father was born
.8052 (.0126)
.9736 (.0067)
in the country; 0 if otherwise
MBORN
1 if respondent’s mother was born
.8052 (.0126)
.9807 (.0058)
in the country; 0 if otherwise
BIGCITY
1 if respondent lives in or on the
.8604 (.0110)
.3037 (.0173)
.5026 (.0210)
outskirts of a big city; 0 if
otherwise
RIGHT
1 if respondent voted for the
.2641 (.0140)
.2952 (.0172)
.5958 (.0206)
political right or far right in the
last general election; 0 if otherwise
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Table II.
Logit Regression Results
- USA
Independent Variables
MALE

Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 3

.1718 [.0210]
(.342)
-.0006 [-.0001]
(.924)
.0695 [.0085]**
(.049)

.1588 [.0188]
(.395)
-.0010 [-.0001]
(.860)
.0845 [.0099]**
(0.025)
-.3599 [-.0439]*
(.064)
.0837 [.0099]
(.684)
-.0186 [-.0022]
(.340)
.0308 [.0036]
(.185)
-1.87e-07 [-2.21e-08]
(.937)
.6526 [..0949]*
(.082)
.6526 [.0576]*
(.041]
-.9592 [-.1512]***
(.006)

.1491 [.0172]
(.426)
-.0001 [-.0000]
(.984)
.0854 [.0098]**
(.021)
-.3080 [-.0365]
(.114)
.0309 [.0036]
(.882)
-.0264 [-.0030]
(.359)
.0401 [.0046]
(.198)
1.32e-07[1.52e-08]
(.956)
.4286 [.0683]
(.197)
.4286 [.0542]*
(.051)
-.3425 [-.0442]
(.388)
-1.049 [-.1519]***
(.002)
.2040 [.0225]
(.568)
-.2684 [-.0332]
(.317)

Equation 4

.1719 [.0191]
(.366)
AGE
.0037 [.0004]
(.547)
EDUCYRS
.0933 [.0103]**
(.011)
CWORK
-.3009 [-.0343]
(.132)
MARRIED
.1348 [.0150]
(.526)
HHCHILDR
-.0247 [-.0027]
(.257)
HHTODD
.0371 [.0041]
(.137)
8.10e-07 [8.98e-08]
US_INC
(.743)
RELIGION1
.4512 [.0581]
(.272)
RELIGION3
.2782 [.0328]
(.203)
CITIZEN
-.2432 [-.0292]
(.547)
FBORN
-1.043 [-.1458]***
(.003)
MBORN
.2884 [.0299]
(.436)
BIGCITY
-.2706 [-.0322]
(.314)
RIGHT
-.9964 [-.0938]***
(.000)
Log Likelihood
-408.49266
-400.07808
-392.75346
-385.34
Chi-Square
4.45
22.70**
39.53***
50.85***
N
996
996
996
996
Logit Coefficients are reported, Marginal Effects are shown in brackets, Robust Standard Error shown in
parenthesis. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level
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Table III.
Logit Regression Results
– Great Britain
Independent Variables
MALE

Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 3

.1711 [.0057]
(.630)
-.0152 [-.0005]
(.106)
.1579 [.0052]***
(.000)

.5221 [.0113]
(.209)
-.0117 [-.0002]
(.462)
.1621 [.0034]***
(.002)
.2328 [.0048]
(.677)
-.3723 [-.0078]
(.464)
.0643 [.0013]
(.776)
-.3898 [-.0081]
(.405)
.0000 [2.18e-07]
(.927)
1.8533 [.0936]***
(.002)
.0626 [.0013]
(.905)
.2876 [.0053]
(.794)

.5172 [.0109]
(.230)
-.0118 [-.0002]
(.451)
.1458 [.0030]***
(.006)
.2133 [.0043]
(.701)
-.2697 [-.0055]
(.601)
.1080 [.0022]
(.648)
-.3129 [-.0064]
(.505)
6.71e-06 [1.36e-07]
(.954)
1.4880 [.0612]**
(.013)
.0837 [.0017]
(.870)
.4223 [.0071]
(.693)
.9879 [.0250]**
(.024)

Equation 4

.5441 [.0113]
(.197)
AGE
-.0093 [-.0002]
(.578)
EDUCYRS
.1452 [.0029]***
(.005)
CWORK
.1452 [.0048]
(.665)
MARRIED
-.2468 [-.0049]
(.633)
HHCHILDR
.0844 [.0017]
(.731)
HHTODD
-.2897 [-.0058]
(.516)
GB_INC
.0000 [4.17e-07]
(.847)
RELIGION1
1.4800 [.0594]**
(.013)
RELIGION3
.0216 [.0004]
(.966)
CITIZEN
.4349 [.0072]
(.678)
BIGCITY
.9806 [.0242]**
(.025)
RIGHT
-.4587 [.0084]
(.436)
Log Likelihood
-134.43109
-97.814956
-95.324262
-94.973097
Chi-Square
17.16***
30.44**
31.12**
37.74***
N
708
708
708
708
Logit Coefficients are reported, Marginal Effects are shown in brackets, Robust Standard Error shown in parenthesis.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level
Note: Data for M_BORN and F_BORN were not available for Great Britain and were thus not controlled for in
Equations 3 and 4 as they were in the United States sample and Turkey sample.
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Logit Regression Results
– Turkey
Independent Variables
MALE

Equation 1

Equation 2

Equation 3

.2776 [.0118]
(.347)
-.02422 [-.0010]*
(.067)
-.0315 [-.0013]
(.381)

.5664 [.0231]*
(.060)
-.0238 [-.0010]**
(.040)
-.0421 [-.0017]
(.281)
-.6889 [-.0260]**
(.037)
-.1698 [-.0070]
(.603)
.0001 [4.37e-06]
(.189)
-.3939 [-.0184]
(.368)
-1.9646 [-.1951]
(.102)

.5201 [.0205]*
(.081)
-.0251 [-.0010]**
(.038)
-.0344 [-.0013]
(.382)
-.6817 [-.0249]**
(.042)
-.1517 [-.0061]
(.643)
.0001 [5.07e-06]*
(.099)
-.5270 [-.0251]
(.226)
-1.6669 [-.1418]*
(.099)
.3691 [.0122]
(.518)
-.6509 [-.0341]
(.285)
-.5769 [-.0237]**
(.044)

Equation 4

.5274 [.0207]*
(.080)
AGE
-.0260 [-.0010]**
(.033)
EDUCYRS
-.0323 [-.0013]
(.424)
CWORK
-.6934 [-.0252]**
(.040)
MARRIED
-.1816 [-.0073]
(.565)
TR_INC
.0001 [5.10e-06]*
(.099)
SUNNI
-.5689 [-.0275]
(.176)
CITIZEN
-1.6880 [-.1446]*
(.094)
FBORN
.3228 [.0109]
(.575)
MBORN
-.6074 [-.0311]
(.331)
BIGCITY
-.5706 [-.0234]**
(.046)
RIGHT
.1532 [.0059]
(.599)
Log Likelihood
-211.75693
-207.54567
-205.62224
-205.51036
Chi-Square
4.07
21.07***
29.82***
32.72***
N
1140
1140
1140
1140
Logit Coefficients are reported, Marginal Effects are shown in brackets, Robust Standard Error shown in parenthesis.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level
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